In his article, ‘‘Science and Social Commitment’’ (Newsletter No. 2) Clive Turner raises a number of important questions; but he does not do justice to the wide-ranging, critical debates they have aroused. Here are some notes on four relevant issues.
(a) Turner states that E. O. Wilson has been criticised ‘‘for asserting that human behaviour had an evolutionary and therefore a genetic basis’’. To object to such a statement - except on the grounds of its banality - would be ludicrous. Controversy has, however, arisen from the attempts of some sociobiologists to interpret human society in neodarwinian terms (1,6,7,8). A leading objective, not always clearly stated, is to identify a syndrome of social patterns, common to the whole human species, to match species-typical activities of animals. Sociobiological doctrines are not uniform and are often inconsistent (2,4), but some criticisms have a general application.
(i) An obvious difficulty is that evolutionary theory cannot tell us what features of our social behaviour had ‘‘survival value’’. Some of our prominent abilities, for instance in music, mathematics and some developments of language and symbolism (and many others), are probably only by-products of the presumed action of natural selection on our ancestors (2,4).
(ii) Human social action depends on our ability, which far exceeds that of other species, to adapt behaviour to circumstances and to transmit our traditions, by teaching, over generations. These features may be held out as ‘human nature’’, but they cannot be usefully reduced to biology (2). The resulting diversity has to be studied by the methods of history, the social sciences and psychology. When, therefore, one looks to sociobiology for new findings on humanity, nothing novel emerges, but only trite statements: for instance, that parents look after their children in preference to those of others; that children sometimes rebel against parental authority; that selfishness, deceit and anti-social violence are widespread; and that sexual promiscuity is common. Sometimes, such phenomena are referred to as through they were unit traits, like blood groups, which can be studied by the methods of neomendelian genetics; but in fact each takes many forms and has many social and other causes, often unknown.
(b) Turner writes: ‘‘Jensen and Eysenck were attacked for... racism and elitism, and Burt was accused of fraud.’’ If the writings of such authors can be shown to be open to criticism on moral grounds, it is proper and necessary to say so. But the primary objections to their proposals are scientific and logical. The main criticism, in short, is that these writers deny, disregard or play down an empirical fact of fundamental social importance: that for the moral, intellectual and physical development of children, some environments are much better than others.
(c) Turner writes, it seems approvingly, of ‘‘selective secondary education based on the testing of intelligence as a constitutional characteristic’’. In doing so, he overlooks three sets of findings.
(i) The intelligence quotient, to which he is presumably referring, measures one kind of ability out of many: it is not an all-purpose index of intellectual quality or of anything else. (3)
(ii) The standard IQ is not an independent measure, like a yardstick: it is based on the scores recorded in the population under study. ‘‘Culture-free’’ tests, if they exist at all, have very severe limitations. (3)
(iii) The word ‘‘constitutional’’ presumably refers to the genetics of the IQ. Although it is doubtful whether the heritability of the IQ has ever been accurately measured, it is sometimes said to be 80% (or some such figure). Owing to confusion about the meaning of ‘‘heritability’’, it is then concluded that little can be dome to influence the IQ by environmental action. This type of error is exposed by findings on human stature, which has a high heritability but is much influenced by nutrition and by the incidence of infective disease.
(d) Lastly, Turner raises the question of the relationship of scientific discovery with the social conditions which influence scientists. On this, certain distinctions should be made.
(i) A scientific advance, even a revolutionary one, always develops from what is already established or assumed. Research may be - indeed often is - influenced by other nonlogical, social factors (and these can, perhaps, be discovered); but research findings themselves are, or should be, judged by the evidence presented and by their logic; that is, they are assessed as part of science.
(ii) Quite obviously, scientific conclusions are also scrutinised for their social applications, favourable or adverse.
(iii) Sometimes, a doctrine is held out as scientific when it is not. The phrenological belief in head bumps as diagnostic of personality is an example. So, it may be held, is a great deal of human sociobiology. According to some authors, the belief that human beings can behave selflessly or altruistically is an illusion; and deceit in our social relationships is the norm. These features, together with a propensity for anti-social violence, are said to be imposed on us by our genes, that is, by natural selection. Such misanthropy, which has a long history (5) may be presented, quite wrongly, as a conclusion drawn from scientific research. (It is also sometimes rejected by the same authors). It is therefore appropriate to examine the doctrine primarily as a social or psychological phenomenon. One may ask what factors have encouraged the propagation of errors; and, more important, what influence the errors will have in the community.
S. A. Barnett
References:
(1) Alexander, R.D. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. (New York: Aldine)
(2) Barnett, S.A. 1988. Biology and Freedom. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)
(3) Flynn, J.R. 1987. Psychological Bulletin: 171-191. Massive IQ gains in 14 nations.
(4) Kitcher, P. 1985. Vaulting Ambition. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
(5) Passmore, J.A. 1970. The Perfectibility of Man. (London: Duckworth.)
(6) Trivers, R.L. 1985. Social Evolution. (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummins.)
(7) van den Berghe, P.L. 1979. Human Family Systems. (New York: Elsevier.)
(8) Wilson, E.O. 1979. On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).